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The effect of sanctions on cooperation depends on social and cultural norms. While free
riding is kept at bay by altruistic punishment in certain cultures, antisocial punishment
carried out by free riders pushes back cooperation in others. In this paper we analyze
sanctions in both a standard public goods game with a linear production function and
an otherwise identical social dilemma in which the minimum contribution determines
the group outcome. Experiments were run in a culture with traditionally high antisocial
punishment (Southern Europe). We replicate the detrimental effect of antisocial sanctions
on cooperation in the linear case. However, we find that punishment is still widely effective
when actions are complementary: the provision of the public good significantly and
substantially increases with sanctions, participants punish significantly less and sanctions
radically transform conditional cooperation patterns to generate significant welfare gains.
Keywords: anti social behavior, punishment, public goods, coordination, experiments
JEL classification numbers: C92
Introduction
Social dilemmas have been extensively analyzed in the lab when the team’s output is a linear
function of the joint contribution to the team (in the so-called voluntary contribution mechanism,
VCM). The provision of the public good typically declines over time in the vast majority of studies.
However, certain mechanisms, such us communication, the inclusion of a threshold and sanctions,
make the provision of the public good to be stable or even increasing over time (see Chaudury,
2011, for a comprehensive survey). This study contributes to the behavioral analysis of punishment,
testing its effectiveness in two different social dilemmas.
The net effect of costly sanctions on the linear provision of public goods is a non-trivial
issue. While evidence strongly suggests punishment may boost contributions to the public good,
cooperation gains do not always compensate the cost of punishment. Moreover, its effectiveness
seems to be heavily mediated by cultural effects; Herrmann et al. (2008) is a very well-known
cross cultural study of how anti-social punishment may decrease the provision of public goods
in societies governed by weak social norms. The behavioral characterization of sanctions is not
particularly challenging in the VCM. Low-contributors free ride on the decisions of others and do
not generate collective benefits. So, when cooperators punish free riders, sanctions are intuitively
labeled as social. When free riders punish cooperators, their behavior is labeled as anti-social,
because it does not serve the group, but individual objectives like revenge. Herrmann et al. (2008)
rely on this characterization. Antisocial punishment may be used for several reasons, and others
authors have defined antisocial punishment in a slightly different way. Bochet et al. (2006) and
Cinyabuguma et al. (2006) use the term perverse punishment when the punisher contributes less
than the others. In our design, we follow Herrmann et al. (2008) arguing that retaliation here can
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only be blind since each participant is never informed of the
punishment that each individual assigned to him.
In many real life situations, public goods do not have
an aggregative production function. The weakest link game
mechanism (WLM) depicts the extreme case in which the
minimum effort level determines the team’s output, and has been
widely used to explore coordination problems in organizations
(Brandts et al., 2015). In this paper we extend the analysis of social
sanctions to the WLM. As in Croson et al. (2005), we consider
two social dilemma games, identically framed. Participants in
the experiment repeatedly interact with the same players, first
without punishment, thenwith the possibility of sanctioning each
other at a cost (as in Herrmann et al., 2008).
In both environments participants make a simple and
identically framed allocation decision. While in the VCM
provision of the public good follows the sum of allocations, in
the WLM it depends on the minimum allocation in the group.
The only difference between both protocols is one line in the
instructions describing the production function as a function
of the average (minimum) individual allocation to the public
account in the VCM (WLM). Our main objective is to analyze
the effectiveness of punishment in this non-linear environment.
How does this change in the production function may affect
sanctioning patterns? Our rationale follows two simple but
powerful intuitions. The first one relates to the lack of a clear-cut
theoretical prediction for the behavioral logic of social antisocial
sanctions in the WLM. The second, with the existence of culture
effects described above. We describe these two intuitions one
by one.
Even when individuals make very similar (and non-trivial)
allocation decisions in the two environments, the logic of
sanctions is fundamentally altered. While social punishment
(sanctioning low contributors) may pursue similar objectives in
both games (to increase cooperation of all, and expand the group
welfare), the behavioral rationale for low contributions is quite
different. While in the VCM low contributors free ride on the
contributions of others (and drive the group away from the
social optimum of full provision), in the WLM low contributors
do not benefit from the contribution of others, as only the
minimum contribution, their low contribution, determines the
group outcome (and, again, drives the group away from the social
optimum). As every single contribution profile is an equilibrium
of the stage game in the WLM, low contributors’ actions may
be the consequence of pessimistic beliefs in a sophisticated
equilibrium selection problem, rather than the outcome of selfish
intentions (e.g., free riding on others). If the actions of low
contributors are judged on the basis of their consequences on
the group outcome, social punishment could be as prevalent
(and cooperation enhancing) as in the VCM. As long as their
decisions are considered to be, at least partially, the consequence
of mistakes, wrong beliefs, or aversion to the strategic uncertainty
of the game, we could expect social punishment to be less intense
than in the VCM, at the cost of less public good provision.
Note that the analysis of antisocial punishment leaves a
similarly open question. Antisocial punishment may follow very
different logics depending on the information individuals receive
about punishers in the previous round. From blind retaliation
of the rest of the group, to targeted retaliation of those who
punished, or the perverse punishment of those who contributed
or punished less than the average, or punished contributors,
the behavioral analysis of antisocial punishment has identified
very different rationales for antisocial behavior (see Bochet et al.,
2006; Cinyabuguma et al., 2006; Denant-Boemont et al., 2007;
Nikiforiakis, 2008 for a discussion).
As we are interested in sanctions as cooperation enhancement
devices, we do not provide individuals any information about
punishment decisions in the previous round. So, in our setting,
antisocial punishment cannot be related to targeted retaliation,
as in Nikiforiakis (2008), or an attempt to sanction those who
do not punish enough, or punish the wrong target (see Denant-
Boemont et al. (2007) for a discussion of how sanctions my be
driven by a desire to punish others on the basis of their sanctions
to third parties). In our experiment, participants do not receive
information about the distribution of sanctions chosen by the
other participants, and their correspondence with the vector of
contributions to the public good1.
Still, the differences between both environments are
important. While the existence of antisocial punishment in the
VCM has been (negatively) linked to the existence of survey
based social norms outside the laboratory (related to civic
cooperation and the rule of law), in the WLM the effect and
interpretation of social norms becomes more problematic.
As Herrmann et al. (2008) make it clear, “Social norms [. . . ]
refer to widely shared views about acceptable behaviors and
the deviations subject to possible punishment” (see p. 1365).
As discussed above, social punishment in both games share at
least the desirability of cooperation, for the sake of the group
welfare. The extent to which antisocial punishment is perceived
as acceptable is one of the open questions this study tries to
answer.
Antisocial punishment, defined as sanctions targeting co-
operators2, cannot be driven by social welfare maximizing
intentions in either the VCM or the WLM. Blind retaliation
in both environments cannot be excluded either. However, the
lowest contributor is in a very different position in the VCM and
the WLM games. As discussed above, she may have contributed
less for very different reasons: selfishness in the VCM vs. strategic
risk aversion or over-pessimistic beliefs about the actions of
others in the WLM. Moreover, because the lowest contributors
fully determine the group outcome only in the WLM, they may
become focal points, and be easily targeted by the rest of the
group. If becoming focal targets helps them to quickly adjust
upwards their contributions, antisocial punishment should be
less frequent and less intense (at the cost of more focalized
punishment).
1We follow closely the spirit of Herrmann et al. (2008), because we are
specifically interested to replicate their study in a location where sanctions did not
substantially increase cooperation when information about individual punishment
decisions was not available, as discussed in the next page.
2As the results section makes clear, using any of the two definitions of cooperators
in anti-social punishment (those above the average contribution in the group, or
above the contribution of the individual punishing) do not affect our results, as
Table A_7 in Appendix II (Supplementary Material) strongly suggests. In line with
Herrmann et al. (2008), we will use the latter in the analysis of social and antisocial
punishment.
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If the intensity of social punishment they receive is perceived
as particularly unfair because low contributors do not benefit
from the contribution of others, blind retaliation could ignite
an escalation of highly detrimental sanctions. As high co-
operators pay a relatively higher price in the WLM (they do
not benefit from their individual contributions as the public
good is determined by the minimum allocation), this escalation
of antisocial punishment could feedback “social” punishment
motivated by retaliation. The net effect of both behavioral forces
on antisocial punishment is impossible to predict without a
controlled behavioral test like the one we run in this paper.
To address these issues we run a series of laboratory
experiments in one particular culture (Southern Europe), where
antisocial punishment has traditionally prevented sanctions to
induce full cooperation in linear public goods. The rationale for
this decision is not difficult to explain. If the virtuous circle based
on the acceptance of (social) punishment of low contributors
and the absence of retaliation based escalation holds, sanctions
could yield a positive result even in Southern Europe. If the
vicious circle of antisocial punishment driven by the lack of
guilt in low cooperators (because they never profited from the
actions of others) triggers a generalization of social and antisocial
punishment, sanctions in the WLM could generate even less
provision of the public good, particularly in a location with weak
norms of civic cooperation.
Our results are clear. We start by replicating the finding
that sanctions are of very limited use in some cultures in
linear environments like the VCM. We then document that the
production technology has significant and vast consequences in
the effectiveness of sanctions. While antisocial punishment is
still largely present in the VCM, social punishment dominates
in the WLM. Individuals punish significantly less in the
WLM than in the VCM, and punishment generates large and
significant welfare gains. Antisocial punishment is rare in the
WLM, and low contributors do not retaliate. Interestingly,
cooperation adjustments are massively asymmetric in the WLM,
as cooperators do not adjust down their contributions when
contributing more than others, at a huge personal cost, while
upward adjustments are large and significantly stronger than in
the VCM.
The rest of the paper goes as follows. Next section reviews
the literature. After this, the subsequent section presents the
experimental design and procedures. The next section introduces
the quantitative analysis of contributions, punishment and
efficiency for the two games simultaneously. Finally, the last
section concludes.
Literature Review
The effects of both social and antisocial sanctions in cooperation
have largely been studied (from Fehr and Gächter, 2000, 2002,
to Nowak, 2006, and Rand and Nowak, 2013). The analysis of
sanction in other species includes the study of wasps (Tibbetts
and Dale, 2004) and monkeys (Hauser, 1992). Punishment
mechanisms in humans were analyzed first in common-pool
resource games (Ostrom et al., 1992) and social dilemmas
(Yamagishi, 1986). Fehr and Gächter (2000, 2002) document
the effect of sanctions in linear public good games, and show
how cooperation pays because defectors suffer the cost of being
punished by cooperators (see also Fehr and Fischbacher, 2003;
Almenberg et al., 2011). The consequence is that cooperationmay
co-evolve with punishment through group selection (Boyd et al.,
2003; Eckel et al., 2014).
The seminal distinction between social and antisocial
punishment starts with Herrmann et al. (2008) and their cross
culture analysis of sanctions in linear social dilemmas. In their
study, they categorize as social punishment sanctions coming
from individuals within a group who contribute more than the
subjects they punish. Low contributors do not only free ride
on the contributions of cooperators but harm the group fitness,
by not exploiting the positive group externality associated with
contributions to the public good. Sanctions of low cooperators
are labeled as social punishment because “from the perspective
of the punisher the target member behaved less pro-socially than
the punisher” (p. 1636). Sanctions of high cooperators are labeled
as antisocial.
Interestingly, a non-negligible fraction of participants in
experiments are willing to pay to punish cooperators (Shinada
et al., 2004; Cinyabuguma et al., 2006; Denant-Boemont et al.,
2007; Dreber et al., 2008; Nikiforiakis, 2008; Gächter and
Herrmann, 2009; Wu et al., 2009; Ellingsen et al., 2013; Hauser
et al., 2014). Herrmann et al. (2008) and Gächter et al. (2010)
show how the intensity of antisocial punishment received by
cooperators across different cultures critically determines the
effectiveness of sanctions. Only when the frequency and intensity
of antisocial punishment is moderate, as in the original studies by
Fehr and Gächter (2000, 2002), run inWestern Europe, sanctions
effectively allow cooperators to increase their fitness in the long
run through cooperation gains.
In this paper we explicitly consider the role of punishment in
different social dilemmas.We specifically focus in the consistency
of social and antisocial punishment across different versions of
the same public goods game. A large number of papers have
studied interesting variations of punishment designs, (e.g., Gintis,
2000; Carpenter and Matthews, 2002; Carpenter et al., 2004).
Masclet et al. (2003) study the power of non-material social
sanctions and find that they still increase contributions in the
short run, but only material (monetary) sanctions are effective in
the long term. Fudenberg and Pathak (2010) find that individuals
are willing to incur in costly punishment even if sanctions are not
observed until the end of the session, supporting the idea that
they somehow enjoy getting engaged in punishment. Quervain
et al. (2004) document how punishers’ personal satisfaction
activates the dorsal striatum.
To the best of our knowledge, our study pioneers in studying
the effects of costly sanctions in two different public goods games.
In both cases, subjects contribute to a collective account and
get similar collective benefits. In addition, games are framed
as an identical allocation problem. The only difference comes
from the team output’s technology. In the first one (the VCM)
the collective account profits are determined by the linear
aggregation of contributions (the average contribution to the
team account), while in the second (the WLM) is a multiple of
the minimum contribution.
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The main strategic differences between our games are two.
First, while a unique inefficient equilibrium exists in the VCM,
every symmetric contribution profile is equilibrium of the stage
game in the WLM. The intuition is that from every symmetric
profile, unilateral deviations never pay. By contributing more
individuals do not expand the public good, and still pay for
the larger contribution. By contributing less, players reduce the
whole team’s outcome at a net personal cost. Second, contributing
to the public good more than others is costlier in theWLM, as no
additional public good is created. But, low contributors receive
no benefit from high contributions, as the team’s output is only
determined by the minimum contribution. In other words, low
contributors cannot free ride on high contributions. Croson et al.
(2005) and Fatas et al. (2006) characterize these two games.
Introducing a non-trivial equilibrium selection problem, the
WLM is a much richer strategic environment. Interestingly,
individuals still get the same earnings in both environments if
they all contribute the same proportion of their endowment. Each
symmetric contribution profile yields the same earnings in both
games. The difference is that symmetric contribution profiles are
equilibria of the stage game only in the WLM. Being the strategy
space of both games quasi-continuous, the equilibrium selection
problem is far from trivial in the WLM. Full contribution Pareto
dominates all other actions, while no contribution satisfies the
maximin criterion and risk dominates the other equilibria of the
game, minimizing losses associated to strategic uncertainty3.
From the group’s fitness perspective, contributing to the public
good is now riskier because contributions above theminimum do
not increase the collective account benefits. Strong contributors
may totally waste their contributions if another player in their
group does not contribute to the public good. Punishment
coming from strong cooperators may still be considered as
social punishment as long as it promotes more cooperation
and contributes to the collective or social welfare (but not
because it sanctions free riding). Punishment implemented by
low contributors when punishedmay still be defined as antisocial,
as it might be highly detrimental for group cooperation.
The interaction between different types of punishment and
the effect of sanctions on group fitness through incentives is
far from trivial when no information about the identity of the
punisher is provided, as in this study. Incentives are the same if an
intermediate cooperator is punished by a complete free rider or
by a full cooperator. However, in this paper we explicitly follow an
agnostic view and consider that even if participants never know
who is punishing them, different types of punishment may (or
may not) have first order effect on group fitness through different
levels of effectiveness. Following Herrmann et al. (2008), our
paper does not try to prove causation; it simply investigates the
existence of different logics in both games supported by the very
different levels of social and antisocial punishment.
In this paper we explore the preeminence of social and
antisocial punishment in both public goods games in a particular
3In Appendix II (Supplementary Material)we present an analysis of equilibrium
selection in theWLMand symmetric contribution profiles in the VCM.As it will be
noted in Section Experimental Results, a detailed analysis of equilibrium selection
is not the main goal of the paper, even when punishment intensity is very different
when participants are in or off-equilibrium.
location: Spain. Gächter and Herrmann (2009) and Gächter et al.
(2010) follow both Inglehart and Baker (2000) and the four
cultural dimensions of Hofstede (2001) to classify countries in
different cultural areas. On the basis of the results obtained
in Greece and Turkey, Southern Europe is defined as a region
with a very moderate level of contributions to the public
good, when sanctions are available (see Figure 1 in p. 2655)
and a quite high level of antisocial punishment (see Figure 2
in p. 2656). Casari and Luini (2009) shows that in standard
VCM games, Italian subjects exhibit considerable antisocial
punishment, Bortolotti et al. (2014) report evidence of social
and antisocial punishment in a sample of college students and
a representative sample of the Italian population playing a
VCM game. Fatas et al. (2010) and Alonso and Gächter (2014)
show that linear public goods games in Spain follow a very
similar pattern. In computerized anonymous experiments run in
Valencia and Granada, respectively, they find that contributions
to the public goods never reach very high levels with punishment,
and Alonso and Gächter (2014) find that antisocial punishment
is as strong as in Greece or Turkey as it is in Granada.
We run our experimental sessions in Valencia, Spain. We
are particularly interested in replicating, first, the prevalence
of antisocial punishment in linear public goods games (the
VCM) and willing to learn whether punishment follows a
similarly destructive dynamic when the production technology
is non-linear.
Experimental Design and Procedures
The Experiment
Our experiment consists of two games and two treatments. As
described above, the two games are the voluntary contribution
mechanism (VCM) and the weakest link mechanism (WLM)4.
Subjects interact over a computerized network of computers
in two blocks of 20 rounds each. So, for each treatment and
game, subjects played a finitely repeated public goods game
for 20 periods. We opt for this relatively long sequence of
repeated interactions because we are interested in testing the
long term effects of sanctions, see Alonso and Gächter (2014)
for an interesting review of this literature. We introduced a
surprise restart5 in the games at the end of the first block, when
costly punishment is introduced. Participants from the large local
database were recruited electronically and randomly assigned to
treatments within the experiment, sessions within each treatment
and cubicles within each session. Individuals were undergraduate
students with different social sciences backgrounds and had
no experience in these games, and participated in only
one session.
In our study, the composition of each group remained
unchanged throughout the experiment (using a partner
protocol). All participants were aware that each block would last
exactly 20 periods. However, they were not aware that a second
4In both cases, contributions are voluntary. We use the term VCM for
convenience, in line with previous studies, as noted in Section Literature Review.
5The surprise- restart technique has been investigated in repeated public goods
experiments (see, e.g., Andreoni, 1988; Croson, 1996, 2000)
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TABLE 1 | Experimental design.
VCM WLM
Block 1 No punishment No punishment
Block 2 Punishment Punishment
Subjects 60 56
Groups 15 14
Production function Linear Minimum
treatment was to follow6. Table 1 summarizes the number of
participants, the independent observations, the production
function and the Nash equilibria predicted for each experimental
manipulation.
VCM
Our first treatment is the standard voluntary contribution
mechanism as presented first by Isaac et al. (1984). VCM games
are the most common in public goods settings (see Ledyard,
1995; Keser, 2002, or Chaudury, 2011, for reviews). The amount
of public good provided depends on the sum of individual
contributions to the public good. Each round, participants
received a fixed endowment of 50 Experimental Currency Units
(ECUs) and had to decide how many ECUs to keep in their
private account and how many to allocate to a collective account.
All the participants made their decision simultaneously and
anonymously. The individual payoff function is then:
pii = (e− ci)+ b ·
n∑
i= 1
ci = (e− ci)+ b · n · avg(ci) (1)
where e is the endowment in ECUs, ci the team account
investment, and b the marginal per capita return (MPCR) from
the project (0.5 in our design). For convenience, the payoff
function was presented to subjects as a function of the relevant
statistic (the average).
As usual in these games, allocation decisions have monetary
consequences. Participants’ monetary compensation depends on
the benefits individuals get from their private account (the ECUs
they keep for themselves), as indicated by the first term of the
equation [1], and from an equal share of the team account’s profit
(second term of the equation). Equation [1] also implies that full
free riding (ci = 0, pii = 50) is a dominant strategy in the stage
game7. However, the aggregate payoff is maximized if each group
member fully contributes to the public good (ci = 50, pii = 100).
Note that with groups of four players, these parameters generate
round numbers and make it relatively easier for participants to
understand the consequences of their actions.
6As in Herrmann et al. (2008), we are not particularly interested in the analysis of
order effect. As Fatas et al. (2010) show, and in line with the original findings of
Fehr and Gächter (2000), the results are very similar if the sequence of games is
reversed.
7As Table A_2a and Figure A_2b in Appendix II (Supplementary Material) makes
clear, the inefficient equilibrium is almost never selected without punishment (80%
of the groups never reached it across the first 20 rounds of the experiment, without
punishment, and it is only selected 2.3% of the times by all groups across these 20
rounds).
WLM
We use in our second treatment a variant of the weakest link
mechanism as studied in Weber et al. (2004). In this particular
game, the amount of public good provided depends on the
minimum allocation to the group account. Participants receive
a fixed endowment of 50 (ECUs) at the beginning of each round,
and have to simultaneously and anonymously decide how many
ECUs to allocate to the group account. The individual payoff
function is then:
pii = (e− ci)+ b · n ·min(ci) (2)
Note that the laboratory protocol used in our WLM is essentially
identical to the one described above for the VCM. Individuals
are randomly assigned to groups of size four, and each individual
received the endowment to allocate between the two accounts,
also neutrally framed as an allocation problem. Participants
earn the sum of their allocations to the private account and
twice the minimum allocation to the public account. Given
that participants are able to choose any contribution up to
one decimal, the stage game has 501 Nash equilibria in pure
strategies. Each symmetric contribution profile is equilibrium of
the game. In the Pareto efficient equilibrium everybody allocates
her endowment to the public account (ci = 50 and pii = 100),
and the equilibrium in which none contributes to the public good
satisfies the safemaximin criterion (ci = 0 and pii = 50).
The WLM has been used to capture features of joint
production with strong complementarities (Weber et al., 2004),
or coordination failure in organizations (Brandts and Cooper,
2006). In their seminal paper, Van Huyck et al. (1991) analyzed
minimum effort coordination games with seven symmetric
Pareto-ranked equilibria. Participants repeatedly played different
versions of the game. The selection of the payoff-dominant
equilibrium was extremely unlikely in almost every single
experimental condition. A quite active branch of the literature
searched for different ways to improve efficiency in these
games (that is, reaching better coordination on Pareto superior
equilibria). Some successful possibilities are to reduce strategic
uncertainty (Van Huyck et al., 1991), adding competition within
or between groups (Riechmann and Weimann, 2008; Croson
et al., 2015), tacit communication (Cachon and Camerer, 1996;
Broseta et al., 2003) or sequential stages (Weber et al., 2004).
Punishment
In the second block of 20 rounds, we introduced a second stage
of punishment in both the VCM and the WLM. As in Fehr
and Gächter (2000), we use both a within- and a between-
subjects design. All participants went through the same sequence
of games: first without punishment and then with punishment
(within-subjects), and they only participated in one experiment
(between-subjects).
In the punishment stage subjects had the opportunity to
simultaneously assign punishment points to the other group
members, after being informed of their individual contributions.
Each punishment point reduces both the earnings of the sender
and the receiver (in 2 and 6 ECUs, respectively, using the
standard fixed rate technology, as in Herrmann et al. (2008)
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and Nikiforiakis and Norrmann, 2008). That is, punishment was
costly not only for those participants punished, but also for any
player sending punishment points. Relative to Herrmann et al.
(2008), we scale up the cost of punishment for both players
because our participants receive 50 ECUs as endowment, rather
than 20. By doing so, we keep the ratio between the cost of
sending and receiving punishment points (1:3). Note that losses
from punishment could exceed the preliminary profits, and losses
were compensated across rounds.
In all treatments and blocks, participants were told at the
end of each round the individual contributions profile8, their
own earnings both in total and coming from both the private
and public accounts, and their preliminary and final profits
after the punishment stage, if available. Participants in our
study were University of Valencia social science undergraduate
students and had no previous experience in similar experiments.
Participants were electronically recruited and were privately paid
at the end of the experiment. Experiments were run at the
experimental laboratory of the University of Valencia, using z-
Tree (Fischbacher, 2007) in 2010 and 2011, and followed the
standardmethodology in experimental economics (including full
anonymity and privacy). Experiments took less than 90min, and
the average earnings were 18e.
Experimental Results
We focus in the analysis of punishment, starting with its
effectiveness. Figure 1 presents the round provision of the public
good (the size of the team output), for both games in the second
block of 20 rounds with punishment, normalized as a percentage
of the maximum (see the lines with markers). As a reference
point, we also add the average provision in the 20 rounds without
punishment (straight lines with no markers). Below Figure 1 we
present some descriptive statistics of provision as percentages of
the maximum provision level, together with the results of simple
and conservative non-parametric tests9.
In line with Croson et al. (2005, 2015), differences across
the two games without punishment are secondary. Provision in
the first period of the WLM is clearly lower than in the VCM
(50% vs. 17%, see Mann–Whitney tests10 in Table 2), because
8Decisions were showed identifying the number of the player within the group.
Thus, subjects can identify the contribution of each member of the group, this
allow them to punish each other identifying contributions. As it will be noted
below, this amount of social identification generates a moderately high level of
provision even without punishment, in line with Alonso and Gächter (2014).
Retaliation here can only be blind since each participant is never informed of the
punishment that each individual assigned to him.
9Note that we present the provision of the public good rather than the average
decision. While allocation and provision coincide in the VCM, in the WLM the
provision of the public good is determined by the minimum allocation to the
group account. Following Herrmann et al. (2008), we are specifically interested
in the effectiveness of sanctions in increasing group fitness, or welfare. Even when
the results are not very different when we plot actions, and we specifically study
the adjustment of decisions later in this section, we believe Figure 1 captures
well the main message of this paper. The curious reader may have a look at
the evolution of provision without punishment in Appendix II (Supplementary
Material), Figure A_1.
10We use a Mann-Whitney rank sum test (at the group level) to analyze the
differences between games, and Wilcoxon signed rank tests to analyze differences
coordination is rare without interaction11. Differences become
only marginally significant for the 20 rounds, and are of a much
smaller magnitude. In line with Alonso and Gächter (2014),
provision with full individual information is moderate in the
VCM (41.44% of the maximum) and slightly higher in the WLM
(53.47%).
When punishment is introduced in the second block,
provision in round 21 is almost identical in both games
(and not significantly different from each other, 48% vs.
45%). The introduction of punishment generates significant
cooperation gains in both games, as provision with punishment
is substantially larger than in the first block: up to 59.77% and
83.35% of the maximum in the VCM and the WLM (significant
at the 1% level running a Wilcoxon sign-rank test).
Figure 1 clearly suggests punishment has very different effects
on the provision of the public good in the VCM and the WLM.
While punishment takes provision close to its maximum in the
WLM (an striking average of 83%), the impact in the VCM is
flatter and more moderate. The asymmetric effect of punishment
is confirmed by non-parametric tests: provision is higher in the
WLM than in the VCM in the second block as a whole (Mann–
Withney test, p-value< 0.000). Provision in the last round of the
block is significantly higher than in the first round in the WLM
(Wilcoxon signed rank test, p-value< 0.0025) but not in the VCM
(p-value< 0.6089).
Note that the one interpretation of this result could be that
the WLM is an easier social dilemma than the VCM. If this
interpretation were true, a little help from informal punishment
would suffice in one game (the WLM) to increase efficiency, but
not in the other. We discard this interpretation because if true,
we would expect our participants to do significantly better in
the WLM than in the VCM when punishment is not available.
In line with Croson et al. (2005) and Croson et al. (2015),
they do not.
As Figure A_1 in Appendix II (Supplementary Material)
suggests, provision stays stable in the second 10 rounds of the
WLM without punishment, and no significant differences are
found between both games without sanctions. Moreover, only
when punishment is available efficiency significantly increases in
the WLM, while it does not in the VCM. As the vast and more
general experimental literature on coordination games seems to
suggest, we also believe there is not much previous support for
the idea that coordination games with multiple equilibria are
simpler than linear social dilemmas. If any, and starting fromVan
Huyck et al. (1991), coordination games seem to be extremely
context dependent.
We specifically try to address this context dependent issue by
showing how in one very particular context (identical for both
games), sanctions are significantly more effective in the WLM
than in the VCM, even when the number of equilibria is much
higher than in the standard minimum game. More than that, we
articulate a rationale based on the negligible impact of antisocial
within games across treatments (punishment vs. non punishment). We only take
one observation per group, treatment and game.
11Note that two vectors of decisions with the same mean and a positive variance
logically generate less provision in the WLM.
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Game Treatment # Rounds First period % All periods %
(# Groups) (Std. dev.) (Std. dev.)
VCM NOPUN 20 50.46 a,E 41.44c,G
(15) (13.72) (20.64)
WLM NOPUN 20 17.14a,F 53.47c,H
(14) (10.94) (38.16)
VCM PUN 20 47.76b,E 59.77d,G
(15) (14.47) (22.92)
WLM PUN 20 45.46b,F 83.35d,H
(14) (39.09) (30.18)
Mann-Whitney test (p-values): a (0.0000), b (0.2839), c (0.0006), d (0.0000).
Wilcoxon test (p-values): C (0.5884), D (0.0109) E (0.0054), F (0.0012),
G (0.0054), H (0.0012).
FIGURE 1 | Provision of the public good.
punishment in one game (the WLM) and not in the other (the
VCM)12.
12Note that effort choices are related to group fitness and efficiency only in the
VCM. An analysis of effort has to be completed by incorporating efficiency gains,
defined as earnings above the no contribution profile, when none contributes to
the public good, and no group externality is generated. Efficiency gains balance
the benefits of provision with the costs of miscoordination, hidden if only effort
is considered. To prove this point, consider the following example, constructed
in an scenario without sanctions. In both games, 3 individuals contribute 40 and
the other one contributes zero. Identical effort profiles generate the same average
effort (30). However, provision and efficiency gains (as defined above) dramatically
differ. While provision is 30 out of a maximum of 50 in the VCM, provision
of the public good is 0 in the WLM. Interestingly, participants are obtaining
substantial efficiency gains in the VCM (average earnings are 80, 30 above the no-
contribution profile) and identical efficiency losses in the WLM (average earnings
are 20, 30 below the minimum symmetric payoff of 50), because of the large
We analyze now the effectiveness of sanctions paying
distinctive attention to the behavioral patterns of social and
antisocial punishment in the two games. Following Herrmann
et al. (2008), we define social (antisocial) punishment as the
one imposed on subjects contributing less (more) than the
sender. Figure 2 below shows social and antisocial punishment
as a function of the distance between the contribution of the
punisher and the contribution to the team account of the
receiver (punished). The distance can be as high as +50 (if the
participant sending punishment points contributed 50 ECUs and
miscoordination cost. Figure A_5 in Appendix II (Supplementary Material)shows
effort and efficiency gains in both games. Interestingly, punishment generates large
efficiency gains in the last ten rounds with punishment only in the WLM, in which
miscoordination is negligible and punishment is rarely used.
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Avg Punishment Anti-social Social
(Std. dev.) (Std. dev.)
VCM Frequency 0.329a 0.476 b
(0.232) (0.183)
WLM Frequency 0.076a 0.342b
(0.086) (0.237)
VCM Intensity 0.740 c 1.472d
(0.752) (0.946)
WLM Intensity 0.266c 1.118d
(0.588) (1.396)
Mann–Whitney rank-sum (p-values): a (0.0019), b (0.1534),
c (0.0099), d (0.1134).
FIGURE 2 | Social and Anti-social punishment.
the participant punished 0) and as low as −50 (if the participant
sending punishment points contributed 50 ECUs less). Following
Herrmann et al. (2008), we group observations in intervals of 10
units.
We measure both the frequency and the intensity of social
and antisocial punishment in the VCM and the WLM.We define
frequency as the proportion of positive punishment events (from
0 to 1, in each interval), and we define intensity as the average
number of punishment point sent (rom 0 to 10, in each interval.
By inspection, Figure 2 shows that in line with the classification
of different cultures made by Gächter and Herrmann (2009)
antisocial punishment is intense in the VCM in Spain, as part
of the Southern European culture. Even when social punishment
is also stronger in frequency and intensity in the VCM, the
magnitude of antisocial punishment is consistent with their
explanation about the weak effect of sanctions in some cultures.
Provision of the public good does not exhibit a positive trend (no
differences between round 21 and round 40), and it fails to reach
60% of full provision because antisocial punishment harms the
positive effect of sanctions.
Interestingly, the WLM looks quite different in our study.
While no significant differences in the frequency and intensity
of social punishment are observed when comparing the VCM
and the WLM (47.6% vs. 34.2% and 1.47 vs. 1.12), antisocial
punishment clearly diverges in the two games (32.9% vs. 7.6%
and 0.74 vs. 0.27). In order to give these comparisons a statistical
support, we compute the average frequency and intensity of
social and antisocial punishment per group (pooling the different
types of social punishment and the different types of antisocial
punishment). We find that antisocial punishment is less frequent
in the WLM than in the VCM (Mann–Whitney rank-sum p-
value < 0.0019) and is significantly less intense (p-value <
0.0099) (15 observations in the VCM; 14 observations in the
WLM). No significant differences are obtained when running the
same comparison for social punishment.
In summary, we observe that punishment is not only less
frequent and less intense in theWLM in our experiment, but also
more asymmetric. When actions are complementary, as in the
WLM, punishment is highly effective generating full provision
of the public good even in Southern Europe. Consistent with
Herrmann et al. (2008) interpretation, punishment is highly
effective when antisocial punishment is rare, and not intense13.
We now try to understand how this asymmetric punishment
pattern translates into contributions to the public good and
efficiency.
We now know that punishment decisions significantly differ
across games. We need to understand what is the differential
effect of social and antisocial punishment in the WLM. In
order to understand the behavioral implications of sanctions
on public good provision, we run a Tobit regression with the
adjustment of individual contributions over time (ct-ct−1) as
dependent variable (presented in Figure 3, below). We introduce
random effects at the individual level, cluster standard errors
at the group level, and focus in the second block of 20
rounds, with punishment. The independent variables in the
analyses try to explain contribution changes as a function
of the relative position of subject i’s decisions, and include
one treatment dummy (WLM: 1 for the WLM and 0 for
the VCM), Period, and two variables indicating the lagged
difference between subject i’s contribution and the average
contribution of the other subjects in the same group, Lag
above, and Lag below, when the difference is positive (negative),
zero otherwise.
These two variables allow us to understand how sanctions
shape contribution adjustments when participants are
contributing more (less) than the rest of the group; that is,
in the position of becoming social (antisocial) punishers.
Additionally, we introduce interaction terms (Period∗WLM, Lag
above∗WLM and Lag below∗WLM) to capture differences across
13Tables A_2a and A_2b analyze effort across games (VCM and WLM) and
conditions (No punishment and Punishment) dividing the data into two
categories: symmetric profiles (when all group members make the same decision
in a given round) and asymmetric profiles. As any symmetric contribution profile
is an equilibrium of the stage game in the WLM, the division could be informative
in the analysis of a different punishment effects in the two games. In line with
Figure 2 above, effort in symmetric profiles are significantly higher than those
observed in asymmetric profiles, with and without punishment, only in the WLM.
In the VCM, symmetric effort profiles are lower than asymmetric ones without
punishment, and higher when sanctions are available. Table A_3a and A_3b in
Appendix II (Supplementary Material)show a similar pattern in efficiency gains.
The equilibrium selection problem does not invalidate Figure 3, as sanctions do
not alter the number of equilibria in the WLM, and symmetric profiles always
generate significantly more effort and efficiency gains.
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Standard errors in parentheses; ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05,
*p < 0
FIGURE 3 | Contribution adjustment.
games14. In this sense, we can isolate the effect of independent
variables in the WLM.
Note that, following Herrmann et al. (2008), Figure 2 uses the
relative position of individual participants to classify punishers
(as social or antisocial). Following most of the literature on
conditional cooperation (see Croson et al., 2005) we classify
contribution adjustments in Figure 3 using the mean decision
of the other participants in the same group. Punishment points
may be send individually, after observing every individual
contribution, and each participant may or may not punish each
other groupmember independently. Participants may only adjust
their contributions once, as a reaction to the contribution of the
others. So, it becomes impossible to use individual decisions as a
reference point in Figure 3, and it is moremeaningful to consider
any contribution change using the mean contribution of the rest
of the team.
For the sake of clarity, Figure 3 plots the predicted
contribution adjustments of the model below when contributing
more (less) than the rest of the group, across the two games
considered, allowing for any non-linearity and including the
standard confidence intervals15. The horizontal axes represents
the absolute distance (from below or above) and the vertical
axes refer to the contribution adjustment, as explained. The table
below Figure 3 presents the coefficients of the estimated model.
Differences between both games are well-defined. Participants
modify their contributions similarly when contributing less than
the rest of the group: they adjust up their contributions, and their
reaction is more intense the larger the distance between their
contribution in (t-1) and the contribution of the rest of the group.
Interestingly, as the significant coefficient of the interaction term
suggests (Lag below∗WLM), the adjustment is more intense in
the WLM.
Differences across games are more intense when participants
contribute more than the others. Consistently with standard
conditional cooperation patterns, participants exhibit the usual
negative adjustment when contributing more than the rest of
the team in the VCM. From above, participants in the VCM
significantly adjust down their contribution, and the intensity
of the adjustment increases with the distance between their
lagged contribution and the lagged contribution of the rest
of the group. In the WLM, this adjustment pattern simply
disappears: participants contributing more than the others do
not adjust down their contributions. As the flat figure and the
positive interaction term (Lag above∗WLM, cancelling out the
negative Lag above coefficient) strongly suggest, the different
use of antisocial punishment is consistent with an interesting
shift of conditional cooperation patters. Figure 2 suggested that
when contributing relatively less, participants in the WLM did
not exhibit antisocial punishment. Figure 3 explains that, when
contributing relatively more, participants in the WLM pay back
by not adjusting down their contributions16.
14These variables capture the interaction between the independent variables and
the treatments dummy.
15Figure 3 is generated using the qfitci Stata command on the predicted
contribution adjustment.
16Table A_7 in Appendix II (Supplementary Material) includes an analysis of how
punishment intensity follows two different reference thresholds as proxies of the
social norm: model 1 (model 2) explains punishment intensity as a function of
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Mann–Whitney test (p-values): a (0.2752), b (0.0008)
Wilcoxon test (p-values): C (0.0609), D (0.0186)
FIGURE 4 | Efficiency.
We conclude this section by studying the consequences on
efficiency, using earnings as a proxy. This discussion is always
present when considering the net fitness effect of sanctions
in public goods experiments. As punishment is costly for
both punisher and punished participants, any conclusion on
fitness gains has to consider the welfare effects of sanctions,
net of any punishment costs. In Figure 4 we plot absolute
earnings with and without punishment at the group level
(earnings without punishment in the horizontal axis, and
earnings with punishment in the vertical axis). We add a
45 degrees line to make the comparison easier. We also
include the results of non-parametric tests at the bottom of
the figure17.
the distance between the contribution of the punisher and the group average (the
contribution of the individual punished). Left censored Tobit models strongly
suggest that sanctions are significantly less intense in the WLM and that both
reference points yield very similar results. Tables A_6a, and Figure A_6b show
that punishment is very rare when all decisions are identical in the group, both
in the VCM and the WLM, reinforcing the idea that punishment is mostly driven
by differences in contributions.
17For the sake of clarity, the table refers to efficiency gains, normalized from 0%
(if no contribution is made to the public good) to 100% (full contribution and no
punishment)
Not surprisingly, Figure 4 shows that the asymmetric
punishment patterns and the different cooperation adjustment
translate into very different efficiency gains. While most of
the groups in the WLM do better (above the 45◦ line) with
punishment (11 out of 14), the opposite result is observed
in the VCM (11 out of 15 groups do worse). These results
are supported by the non-parametric tests shown below, using
a linear transformation of earnings into efficiency gains (as
discussed above, earnings above the no-contribution level): no
differences are observed without punishment (41.45 vs. 45.72,
p-value < 0.2752), but differences are extremely large and
significant with punishment (17.92 vs. 69.46, p-value < 0.0008).
Interestingly, earnings significantly increase with punishment in
the WLM, p-value < 0.0186 (marginally decrease in the VCM,
p-value< 0.0609).
Discussion
Costly punishment has substantial effects in human cooperation.
In this paper we present the results of a sequence of experiments
run in Southern Europe using two different public goods games.
When the production technology is linear, as in the VCM,
punishment has only a small positive effect on contributions,
hindered by a substantial amount of antisocial punishment.
When the production technology is non-linear, as in the WLM,
public good provision is significantly increased by punishment,
and contributions go up to 95% of the endowment at the end of
the experiment. In this sense, punishment in our experiment has
a stronger positive effect in the WLM, as both the trend and the
absolute levels of public good provision are significantly above
the ones observed in the VCM.
Our data provides a rationale for this difference, as
participants in our study use punishment in very different ways,
and when used, it generates very different behavioral reactions.
While social punishment is indistinguishable in the two games,
antisocial punishment is rare, and remarkably less intense in the
WLM. The moderate use of antisocial punishment generates a
positive effect on contribution adjustments, and the conditional
cooperation of top contributors is reinforced by the lack of
antisocial punishment: contributors do not adjust down their
contribution to the contribution of others, boosting provision,
and earnings.
Our experiments were run in a location where the
effectiveness of punishment tends to be moderate. We replicate
this findings when the production technology of the public
good is linear, but completely fail to replicate this result when
the technology follows a weak-ling dynamic and contributions
to the public good are complementary. Given that our study
was run only in one location, we cannot infer much about
the effectiveness of sanctions in other locations when using
the same weak link technology. However, under the realistic
assumption that the production technology of public goods
does not have to be unique, our study significantly contributes
to the debate on the co-evolution of cooperation norms
and punishment.
The very moderate use of antisocial punishment in the
WLM shows that the connection between cooperation norms
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and sanctions may critically depend on the team production
technology. Our results suggest that the portability of the vicious
circle linking antisocial punishment with weak cooperation
norms and poor group performance could be limited to
particular types of public goods, and non-necessarily replicable
in other forms of group interactions.
Author Contributions
Enrique Fatas contributed to the original study design, run
the experimental sessions, interpreted the data, wrote the
final versions of the manuscript. Guillermo Mateu assisted
running the sessions, assisted in the interpretation of the
data, and wrote the first draft under the supervision of
Enrique Fatas.
Acknowledgments
Guillermo Mateu gratefully acknowledges the financial support
from Conseil Régional de Bourgogne in support to PARI
(grant code 2014-9201AAO50S04405) and Burgundy School of
Business. Enrique Fatas gratefully acknowledges the financial
support from the ESRC Network for 1198 Integrated Behavioral
Science (NIBS; grant code ES/K002101/1).
Supplementary Material
The Supplementary Material (Appendix I contents the
experimental set of instructions and Appendix II adds extra




Almenberg, J., Dreber, A., Apicella, C. L., and Rand, D. G. (2011). Third Party
Reward and Punishment: Group Size, Efficiency and Public Goods Psychology
and Punishment.Hauppauge, NY: Nova Science Publishers.
Alonso, A., and Gächter, S. (2014). The Role of Social Identification for Peer
Punishment and Cooperation. University of Nottingham, mimeo.
Andreoni, J. (1988). Why free ride? strategies and learning in public goods
experiments. J. Public Econ. 37, 291–304. doi: 10.1016/0047-2727(88)
90043-6
Bochet, O., Page, T., and Putterman, L. (2006). Communication and punishment
in voluntary contribution experiments. J. Econ. Behav. Organ. 60, 11–26. doi:
10.1016/j.jebo.2003.06.006
Bortolotti, S., Casari, M., and Pancotto, F. (2014). Norms of punishment:
experiments with students and the general population. Economic Inquiry 53,
1207–1223. doi: 10.1111/ecin.12187
Boyd, R., Gintis, H., Bowles, S., and Richerson, P. J. (2003). The evolution
of altruistic punishment. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U.S.A. 100, 3531–3535. doi:
10.1073/pnas.0630443100
Brandts, J., and Cooper, D. J. (2006). A change would do you good. An
experimental study on how to overcome coordination failure in organizations.
Am. Econ. Rev. 96, 669–693. doi: 10.1257/aer.96.3.669
Brandts, J., Cooper, D. J., Fatas, E., and Qui, S. (2015). Stand by Me. Experiments
on Help and Commitment in Coordination Games. Management Science
(Forthcoming).
Broseta, B., Fatas, E., and Neugebauer, T. (2003). Asset markets and equilibrium
selection in public goods games with provision points. Econ. Inq. 41, 574- 591.
doi: 10.1093/ei/cbg029
Cachon, G., and Camerer, C. (1996). Loss avoidance and forward induction
in experimental coordination games. Q. J. Econ. 111, 165–194. doi:
10.2307/2946661
Carpenter, J. P., and Matthews, P. (2002). Social Reciprocity. Working Paper,
Middlebury College Department of Economics, 2002–2029.
Carpenter, J. P., Matthews, P., and Ong’ong’a, O. (2004). Why punish? Social
reciprocity and the enforcement of pro-social norms. J. Evol. Econ. 14, 407–429.
doi: 10.1007/s00191-004-0212-1
Casari, M., and Luini, L. (2009). Cooperation under alternative punishment
institutions: an experiment. J. Econ. Behav. Organ. 71, 273–282. doi:
10.1016/j.jebo.2009.03.022
Chaudury, A. (2011). Sustaining cooperation in laboratory public goods
experiments: a selective survey of the literature. Exp. Econ. 14, 47–83. doi:
10.1007/s10683-010-9257-1
Cinyabuguma, M., Page, T., and Putterman, L. (2006). Can second-order
punishment deter perverse punishment? Exp. Econ. 9, 265–279. doi:
10.1007/s10683-006-9127-z
Croson, R., Fatas, E., and Neugebauer, T. (2005). Reciprocity, matching and
conditional cooperation in two public goods games. Econ. Lett. 87, 95–101. doi:
10.1016/j.econlet.2004.10.007
Croson, R. T. A., Fatas, E., Neugebauer, T., andMorales, A. J. (2015). Excludability.
A laboratory study on forced ranking in team production. J. Econ. Behav. Org.
114, 13–26. doi: 10.1016/jebo.2015.03.005
Croson, R. T. A. (1996). Partners and strangers revisited. Econ. Lett. 53, 25–32. doi:
10.1016/S0165-1765(97)82136-2
Croson, R. T. A. (2000). Feedback in voluntary contribution mechanisms: an
experiment in team production. Res. Exp. Econ. 8, 85–97. doi: 10.1016/S0193-
2306(01)08005-X
Denant-Boemont, L., Masclet, D., and Noussair, C. (2007). Punishment,
counterpunishment and sanction enforcement in a social dilemma experiment.
Econ. Theory 33, 1432–1479. doi: 10.1007/s00199-007-0212-0
Dreber, A., Rand, D. G., Fudenberg, D., and Nowak, M. A. (2008). Winners don’t
punish. Nature 452, 348–351. doi: 10.1038/nature06723
Eckel, C., Fatas, E., Godoy, S., andWilson, R. (2014).Group Extinction. Texas A&M
University, mimeo.
Ellingsen, T., Herrmann, B., Nowak, M. A., Rand, D. G., and Tarnita, C. E. (2013).
Civic Capital in Two Cultures: The Nature of Cooperation in Romania and USA.
doi: 10.2139/ssrn.2179575
Fatas, E., Morales, A. J., and Ubeda, P. (2010). Blind justice. an experiment on
random punishment in team production. J. Econ. Psychol. 31, 358–373. doi:
10.1016/j.joep.2010.01.005
Fatas, E., Neugebauer, T., and Perote, J. (2006). Within team competition
in the minimum game. Pac. Econ. Rev. 11, 247–266. doi: 10.1111/j.1468-
0106.2006.00312.x
Fehr, E., and Fischbacher, U. (2003). The nature of human altruism. Nature 425,
785–791. doi: 10.1038/nature02043
Fehr, E., and Gächter, S. (2000). Cooperation and punishment in public goods
experiments. Am. Econ. Rev. 90, 980–994. doi: 10.1257/aer.90.4.980
Fehr, E., and Gächter, S. (2002). Altruistic punishment in humans. Nature 415,
137–140. doi: 10.1038/415137a
Fischbacher, U. (2007). Z-tree: Zurich toolbox for ready-made economic
experiments. Exp. Econ. 10, 171–178. doi: 10.1007/s10683-006-9159-4
Fudenberg, D., and Pathak, A. (2010). Unobserved punishment supports
cooperation. J. Public Econ. 94, 78–86. doi: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2009.10.007
Gächter, S., andHerrmann, B. (2009). Reciprocity, culture and human cooperation:
previous insights and a new cross-cultural experiment. Philos. Trans. R. Soc.
Lond. B Biol. Sci. 364, 791–806. doi: 10.1098/rstb.2008.0275
Gächter, S., Herrmann, B., and Thöni, C. (2010). Culture and cooperation.
Philos. Trans. R. Soc. Lond. B Biol. Sci. 365, 2651–2661. doi: 10.1098/rstb.20
10.0135
Gintis, H. (2000). Strong reciprocity and human sociality. J. Theor. Biol. 206,
169–179. doi: 10.1006/jtbi.2000.2111
Frontiers in Behavioral Neuroscience | www.frontiersin.org 11 April 2015 | Volume 9 | Article 107
Fatas and Mateu Antisocial punishment in two social dilemmas
Hauser, M. D. (1992). Costs of deception: cheaters are punished in rhesus
monkeys (Macaca mulatta). Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U.S.A. 89, 12137–12139.
doi: 10.1073/pnas.89.24.12137
Hauser, O. P., Nowak, M. A., and Rand, D. G. (2014). Punishment does
not promote cooperation under exploration dynamics when anti-social
punishment is possible. J. Theor. Biol. 360, 163–171. doi: 10.2139/ssrn.2298851
Herrmann, B., Thöni, C., and Gächter, S. (2008). Antisocial punishment across
societies. Science 319, 1362–1367. doi: 10.1126/science.1153808
Hofstede, G. H. (ed.). (2001).Culture’s Consequences: Comparing Values,Behaviors,
Institutions and Organizations Across Nations. SAGE Publications Inc.
Inglehart, R., and Baker, W. E. (2000). Modernization, cultural change, and the
persistence of traditional values. Am. Sociol. Rev. 65, 19. doi: 10.2307/26
57288
Isaac, R. M., Walker, J. M., and Thomas, S. H. (1984). Divergent evidence on free
riding: An experimental examination of possible explanations. Public Choice
43, 113–149. doi: 10.1007/BF00140829
Keser, C. (2002). “Cooperation in public goods experiments,” in Surveys in
Experimental Economics Contributions to Economics, eds F. Bolle and M.
Lehmann-Waffenschmidt (Heidelberg: Springer Verlag), 71–90. doi: 10.1007/
978-3-642-57458-0_5
Ledyard, J. O. (1995). “Public goods: a survey of experimental research,” in
Handbook of Experimental Economics eds J. H. Kagel and A. E. Roth (Princeton,
NJ; Princeton University Press), 111-194.
Masclet, D., Noussair, C., Tucker, S., and Villeval, M. C. (2003). Monetary and
nonmonetary punishment in the voluntary contributions mechanism. Am.
Econ. Rev. 03, 366–380. doi: 10.1257/000282803321455359
Nikiforiakis, N., and Norrmann, H. T. (2008). A comparative statics analysis
of punishment in public-good experiments. Exp. Econ. 11, 358–369. doi:
10.2139/ssrn.747144
Nikiforiakis, N. (2008). Punishment and counter-punishment in public good
games: can we really govern ourselves? J. Public Econ. 92, 91–112. doi:
10.2139/ssrn.764185
Nowak, M. A. (2006). Five rules for the evolution of cooperation. Science 314,
1560–1563. doi: 10.1126/science.1133755
Ostrom, E., Walker, J., and Gardner, R. (1992). Covenants with and without
a Sword: self governance is possible. Am. Polit. Sci. Rev. 86, 404–417. doi:
10.2307/1964229
Quervain, D. J. F., Fischbacher, U., Treyer, V., Schellhammer, M., Schnyder, U.,
Bucj, A., et al. (2004). The neutral basis of altruistic punishment. Science 305,
1524–1559. doi: 10.1126/science.1100735
Rand, D. G., and Nowak, M. A. (2013). Human cooperation. Trends Cogn. Sci. 17,
413–425. doi: 10.1016/j.tics.2013.06.003
Riechmann, T., and Weimann, J. (2008). Competition as a coordination device:
experimental evidence from a minimum effort coordination game. Eur. J. Polit.
Econ. 24, 437–454. doi: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2007.09.004
Shinada, M., Yamagishi, T., and Ohmura, Y. (2004). False friends are worse
than bitter enemies: “altruistic” punishment of in-group members.
Evol. Hum. Behav. 25, 379–393. doi: 10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2004.
08.001
Tibbetts, E. A., and Dale, J. (2004). A socially enforced signal of quality in a paper
wasp. Nature 432, 218–222. doi: 10.1038/nature02949
Van Huyck, J. B., Battalio, R. C., and Beil, R. O. (1991). Strategic uncertainty,
equilibrium selection, and coordination failure in average opinion games. Q.
J. Econ. 106, 885–910. doi: 10.2307/2937932
Weber, R. A., Camerer, C., and Knez,M. (2004). Timing and virtual observability in
ultimatum bargaining and ‘weak link’ coordination games. Exp. Econ. 7, 25–48.
doi: 10.1023/A:1026257921046
Wu, J., Zhang, B., Zhou, Z., He, Q., Zheng, X., Cressman, R., et al. (2009). Costly
punishment does not always increase cooperation. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U.S.A.
106, 17448–17451. doi: 10.1073/pnas.0905918106
Yamagishi, T. (1986). The provision of a sanctioning system as a public
good. J. Pers. Soc. Psychol. 51, 110–116. doi: 10.1037/0022-3514.51.
1.110
Conflict of Interest Statement: The authors declare that the research was
conducted in the absence of any commercial or financial relationships that could
be construed as a potential conflict of interest.
Copyright © 2015 Fatas and Mateu. This is an open-access article distributed
under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (CC BY). The use,
distribution or reproduction in other forums is permitted, provided the original
author(s) or licensor are credited and that the original publication in this journal
is cited, in accordance with accepted academic practice. No use, distribution or
reproduction is permitted which does not comply with these terms.
Frontiers in Behavioral Neuroscience | www.frontiersin.org 12 April 2015 | Volume 9 | Article 107
